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Abstract
Exponential-growth bias (EGB) is the tendency for individuals to partially neglect com-
pounding of exponential growth. We develop a model wherein biased agents misperceive the
intertemporal budget constraint, and derive conditions for overconsumption and dynamic in-
consistency. We construct an incentivized measure of EGB in a US-representative population
and ﬁnd substantial bias, with approximately one-third of subjects estimated as the fully-biased
type. The magnitude of the bias is negatively associated with asset accumulation, and does not
respond to a simple graphical intervention.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all intertemporal ﬁnancial decisions involve real or nominal values that change exponen-
tially over time. Proper computation of exponential functions is thus at the heart of many economic
decisions such as lifecycle consumption and portfolio choice. Many people, however, exhibit a strong
systematic bias towards linear growth when estimating such functions. This can have large posi-
tive and normative consequences. Moreover, an economist who does not account for this bias may
mis-interpret observed behavior, such as the pervasive borrowing through payday loans with APRs
exceeding 3000%1 as well as the apparently low retirement savings of many households.2 We incor-
porate the misperception of exponential growth in a model of lifecycle consumption, measure the
bias in a representative sample of the US population, and ﬁnd that savings behavior is consistent
with the predictions of the model. This paper suggests that exponential-growth bias (EGB)— the
tendency for individuals to underestimate exponential growth due to the neglect of compounding
— may be an important missing factor in lifecycle consumption puzzles, and must be considered
alongside other explanations such as time-inconsistent preferences, or unobserved substitution to
home production.
While there are folk stories illustrating people’s underestimation of exponential growth going
back millennia,3 to our knowledge, Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) conducted the ﬁrst published
experiment demonstrating this phenomenon in the psychology literature. Subsequent studies found
the same pattern of underestimation (Wagenaar and Timmers, 1979; Keren, 1983; Benzion, Granot
and Yagil, 1992; Almenberg and Gerdes, 2012). Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) wrote an early model
of exponential-growth bias that used two parameters in which an exponential function of the form
x(t) = act is perceived as xˆ(t) = αacβt.
Stango and Zinman (2009) introduced EGB to the economics literature and extended the
1The U.S. payday loan industry is so successful that brick-and-mortar payday loan locations exceed the number
of McDonalds and Starbucks combined (Skiba and Tobacman, 2011).
2While the adequacy of retirement savings is the subject of ongoing debate, Munnell et al. (2006) argue that more
than 40% of U.S. households are saving insufficiently to maintain their standard of living into retirement. Poterba
et al. (2011) find that the 30th percentile household age 65–69 had total investment savings (financial assets plus
personal retirement account) of $5,500 in 2008, while the median had total investment savings of only $52,000.
3According to legend, the ruler of an Indian kingdom granted the inventor of chess a single boon. The inventor
requested a quantity of rice that doubled for every square on the chessboard, starting with a single grain. The ruler
quickly accepted the request only to later discover that the sum exceeded the kingdom’s entire store.
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Wagenaar-Sagaria model to environments where people face loans with periodic payments. They
show that EGB causes people to underestimate the future value of savings and the costs associated
with borrowing. Using an interest-rate question as a proxy for EGB on the 1977 and 1983 Survey
of Consumer Finances, they ﬁnd that errors on the question are correlated with a number of im-
portant economic outcomes. Those with larger errors have higher short-term debt to income ratios,
lower stock ownership as a percentage of portfolios, lower savings rates, lower net worth, and no
diﬀerence in long-term debt to income ratios, all as predicted by their model. In a subsequent paper
Stango and Zinman (2011) show that when APR disclosure was mandated by law and enforced,
the interest rates on loans taken by the most biased and the least biased were compressed. This
suggests that without regulation, lenders price-discriminated on borrowers’ cognitive biases.
Our ﬁrst contribution is the development of a model of EGB that is both empirically accurate
and portable. We parameterize the model such that the agent’s perception is as if an asset is
divided into two accounts: a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 grows with compounding interest at the interest
rate αi, and a fraction 1 − α grows with simple interest. The perception of the future period-T
value at time t ≤ T is given by p(i, t;α) =
∏T−1
s=t (1 + αis) +
∑T−1
s=t (1 − α)is. Thus when α = 1
the agent has correct perceptions and when α = 0 the agent believes an asset with compounding
interest grows linearly. We derive a fully general model in Appendix A, for which all our main
results extend.
Our model has several improvements over the Wagenaar-Sagaria model. First, the Wagenaar-
Sagaria model implies that a biased agent will underestimate growth even after one period when
interest has not yet compounded, whereas we ﬁnd that three-quarters of our sample get this exactly
correct. Second, our model nests full neglect of compounding (misperceiving compound interest
as simple interest), which we observe in about one third of our sample. Third, our model predicts
that a biased individual will underestimate the value of a depreciating asset, which is supported by
the data. Fourth, our model predicts that an agent, when estimating the constant-rate equivalent
of a ﬂuctuating return, will tend to be biased toward the arithmetic mean – not realizing, for
example, that they are left strictly worse oﬀ by a 10% gain followed by a 10% loss. As a result,
the biased agent will exhibit as-if risk preferences, being insuﬃciently sensitive to large negative
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periodic returns. An economist who believed that uncertainty generated the variation in returns
would infer that the agent had risk-seeking preferences. Finally, our model accounts for framing
eﬀects in a transparent way: the period-length of any asset must be stated as a primitive of the
model.
Stango and Zinman (2009) develop a more general model in their online appendix for which both
the Wagenaar-Sagaria model and our parametric model (with constant interest rates) are special
cases. Their general model puts minimal assumptions on the perception function.4 We extend the
space under consideration by allowing for interest rates to vary over time and the framing of the
problem, in the sense of period length, to be exogenously varied. Then in our general model in
Appendix A, we put greater restrictions on what types of errors are counted as exponential-growth
bias. For example, a person who underestimates the sum of a stream of payments because he cannot
do addition could be characterized as suﬀering from EGB in the Stango and Zinman general model,
whereas we restrict EGB to the underestimation of the cross-partial derivatives of the perception
function with respect to two interest rates. Our model thus isolates the eﬀect of EGB from other
perceptual errors.
As our second contribution, we embed our portable model of EGB in a lifecycle-consumption
environment and explore the behavior of a biased agent. EGB leads the agent to make two fun-
damental errors regarding his intertemporal budget constraint. First, the consumer misperceives
the value of his income over time. With positive interest rates this causes the consumer to over-
estimate the value of future income. We call this the wealth effect of exponential-growth bias, as
it operates through a perceived wealth eﬀect on future earnings.5 Second, the agent misperceives
the relative prices of consumption over time. With positive interest rates this causes the agent to
overestimate the price of future consumption relative to present consumption. We call this the price
effect of exponential-growth bias, and it combines the standard income and substitution eﬀects on
consumption choices (albeit over a misperception rather than a real price change).
4In particular: perceptions are accurate when the bias is zero, growth is never perceived as negative, perceptions
are strictly decreasing in the bias parameter, perceptions are strictly increasing in both the interest rate and the time
horizon, and differences in perceptions for a given interest rate and bias pair and another interest rate and bias pair
increase in the time horizon.
5We treat income as exogenous in our exposition; endogenizing income does not qualitatively change the predictions
of the model.
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These eﬀects yield novel predictions that diverge from both classical models and existing be-
havioral models. Because agents overestimate the value of future income, shifting income to later
periods in a way that preserves lifetime wealth will increase consumption in the present. We derive
suﬃcient conditions under which the consumer will overconsume in the present for any positive
income vector and any smooth utility function. While commitment is generally thought to help
present-biased agents, it will in fact often exacerbate overconsumption for an EGB agent who locks
in his biased consumption plans. Moreover, because the perception of future prices and lifetime
wealth changes each period, the agent will behave in a dynamically inconsistent manner that is
distinct from the pattern generated by dynamically inconsistent time preference: he will revise his
consumption plans upward when he is a net saver and downwards when he is a net borrower.
We believe that present-biased and other dynamically inconsistent preferences play an important
role in intertemporal consumption decisions, but that many ﬁnancial choices are more plausibly
explained with the presence of EGB. For example, Skiba and Tobacman (2008) estimate that a
short-run discount factor β = 0.53 and an (annualized) long-run discount factor δ = 0.45 are
necessary to explain payday loan take-up and default rates. A fully EGB agent could misperceive
the costs of debt by orders of magnitude — especially if the loan is framed in terms of a daily
or weekly interest rate — rationalizing the take-up of such loans with less extreme values of the
discount factors.
An additional distinction is that a present-biased agent with access to credit and without com-
mitment devices would choose to receive income to maximize his intertemporal budget constraint
just like an exponential discounter, while an EGB agent may not. For instance, if the agent has a
liquid asset with a return below the prevailing interest rate, then the non-EGB agent, be it expo-
nential discounter or present biased, will sell immediately and save in an un-dominated vehicle. In
contrast, EGB agents may hold strictly dominated assets.
As a third contribution we measure the pervasiveness of EGB and test the validity and relevance
of our model in a representative sample. Subjects answer questions about the relative value of two
ﬁnancial assets and are paid for accuracy. Using our model we estimate the accuracy α by subject
and ﬁnd that about one third of the population is fully biased with α = 0. The median bias is
4
0.6 and 96% of subjects are estimated to have an α < 1 (i.e. underestimate compound growth).
This is despite the fact that subjects participated online and had access to whatever tools (e.g.
ﬁnancial calculators, help from friends) that they chose to use. Various questions also produce
“ﬁngerprinted” EGB responses that are predicted only by our model. Regressing log savings on α,
we ﬁnd that it enters positively and signiﬁcantly while controlling for income, education, age, and
other covariates. Moving from full bias to full accuracy is associated with a ceteris paribus 55–90%
increase in accumulated assets. This augments the Stango-Zinman ﬁnding, that bias is correlated
with savings and net worth, by using a direct elicitation of EGB instead of a proxy.6
We additionally ﬁnd that α is uncorrelated with age and education, indicating that the bias does
not diminish with some measures of experience. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a graphical “de-biasing”
intervention had no eﬀect on subjects’ perceptions of exponential growth. While other experimental
de-biasing interventions have met with mixed results (MacKinnon and Wearing, 1991; Eisenstein
and Hoch, 2007; McKenzie and Liersch, 2011; Soll et al., 2011; Goda et al., 2014; Song, 2012), ours
is unique in assessing the additional eﬀect on biased perceptions when subjects may already use
external resources. As a “back of the envelope” calculation, our estimates imply that the median
American suﬀers a welfare loss equivalent to 2–5% of lifetime wealth as a result of EGB-induced
mis-optimization.
While we focus on EGB, we note that people likely make additional errors when trading oﬀ sums
of money over time. In one task of our experiment, subjects must compute the value of an account
subject to periodic contributions. On these questions one third of responses are below the gross
contributions, indicating that not only do people misperceive exponential growth, they also cannot
add. A recent literature has looked at other ways in which agents mis-perceive prices (Chetty,
Looney and Kroft, 2009; Gabaix, 2014), though often with a diﬀerent focus. Read, Frederick and
Scholten (2013) demonstrate other framing eﬀects, for example that describing the decision between
money now and more money in one year as an interest rate causes people to be more patient. Our
6Although it would be possible to use their data (the 1977 and 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances) to estimate α,
there are some shortcomings with this data. The question was not incentivized and there was only a single question.
We find that there is considerable measurement error in α. In contrast we estimate α using 10 incentivized questions.
Also, the question is not ideal for measuring EGB. It is sensitive to respondents beliefs about typical APRs, and
solving requires several arithmetic operations. It is about as complex as our most complex questions, the “Periodic
Savings” domain, on which we find evidence that many subjects under-estimate sums as well.
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analysis generally focuses on comparative static predictions as economic variables change within a
given frame, although we discuss the framing of period length in Section 2.3. The framing of other
aspects of the problem are beyond the scope of this paper.
The next section presents the model. In Section 3 we measure the prevalence of EGB in the
population. The paper concludes in Section 4.
2 Theory
2.1 Model
We consider an agent who faces a vector of interest rates ~ı =<i0, i1, . . . , iT−1>∈ R
T , and a vector
of cash ﬂows (income, contributions, debits, etc.) ~y =<y0, . . . , yT >∈ R
T . Both the cash ﬂows
and interest rates are certain and known to the agent. The timing of cash ﬂows, and the unit
of time treated as a “period” are given exogenously, as is the length of the vector ~y.7 We deﬁne
p(~i, t) to be the agent’s perception of the period-T value of one dollar invested at time t. For
example, the correct perception would be p(~i, t) =
∏T−1
τ=t (1+ iτ ), whereas a perception that ignored
all compounding would be p(~i, t) = 1 +
∑T−1
τ=t iτ .
We consider a simple one-parameter model of EGB, using the parameter α to denote the
accuracy of the agent’s perception. For ease of exposition, we will refer to an agent whose perception
corresponds to a degree α of exponential-growth bias as an α-Eddie. While there are many possible
functional forms for intermediate degrees of exponential-growth bias, our simple parameterization
gives the perceptions of an α-Eddie as:
p(i, t;α) =
T−1∏
s=t
(1 + αis) +
T−1∑
s=t
(1− α)is (1)
The α-Eddie model is both convenient and well-behaved mathematically, and also has a coherent
psychological interpretation. A 1-Eddie correctly perceives the asset growing exponentially, while
7The agent’s perceptions are not neutral with respect to the framing of time. In general, finer divisions (e.g. days
rather than years) will lead to more opportunity for compounding and hence a greater mistake on the part of the
agent. Such non-neutrality is often a feature of models which deviate from neoclassical rationality with exponential
discounting – for example, the importance of determining what constitutes the “present” in hyperbolic discounting.
We discuss later the implications of this non-neutrality for firms facing biased consumers.
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a 0-Eddie is fully biased and perceives the asset growing linearly according to simple interest. An
α-Eddie’s perception corresponds to what would result if part of the interest were siphoned away
into a non-compounding account. That is, if a fraction α of the interest accumulated in an account
that will grow in future periods with the interest rate αi, and the remaining fraction 1− α of the
accumulated interest were sequestered to a non-growing account (e.g. placed under the mattress).
This is, of course, not meant to be taken literally. In Appendix A we present a non-parametric
general model of exponential-growth bias, which does not rely on a particular functional form of
the perception function.
Another way to understand Equation (1) is that it implicitly deﬁnes distorted interest rates iˆs(~i)
for each period as a function of all other interest rates under consideration. The agent then applies
these distorted rates to the correct exponential formula. If all interest rates are weakly positive,
then iˆs < is. Because EGB results from an under-appreciation of compounding, iˆ is more distorted
as the number of non-zero elements in ~i increases. It is generally more convenient, however, to
directly apply the perception function p(~i, t) in most cases.
Eddie’s perception at time t of the period-τ value of a general asset with vector of cash ﬂows
~yt =<yt+1, ..., yT > is given by:
Vˆt,τ (~yt,~ı;α) =
compounding interest and cash flows︷ ︸︸ ︷(
τ∑
s=t
ys
τ−1∏
r=s
(1 + αir)
)
+
simple interest of cash flows︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)
τ∑
s=t
(
τ−1∑
r=s
ir
)
ys (2)
for all τ ≤ T . Eddie will only misperceive the value of an asset at least two periods into the future
since p(i, T − 1;α) = 1 + i, which is correct.
The α-Eddie model has several strengths. First, it is tractable and relatively easy to estimate
the single parameter. It is also suﬃciently ﬂexible to encompass complex choices. Moreover, while
an α-Eddie’s perception of the growth of an asset converges in the long run to exponential growth,
it is at the lower growth rate αi rather than the true i.
7
2.2 Theoretical Results
We now explore a biased agent’s behavior in a simple lifecycle-consumption environment. Suppose
an agent has an instantaneous utility function over consumption u(ct) that is continuously diﬀer-
entiable, strictly concave, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions: u′(0) = ∞ and limct→∞ u
′(ct) = 0.
The agent is born in period 0 and dies in period T > 1, and he must choose his consumption in
each period in order to maximize lifetime utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
That consumers broadly bracket their consumption with reference to their entire lifetime wealth is
perhaps unrealistic, but is a standard assumption in the literature (Friedman, 1957), as it captures
the essence of the problem in a tractable way. We further assume for simplicity that the horizon
to which perceptions apply, the parameter T in equation (1), is the ﬁnal consumption period.8
In each period the agent receives a (possibly negative) cash ﬂow yt and he may purchase or
sell shares of a risk-free asset with period-speciﬁc interest rates it ≥ 0 (with the inequality strict
for at least two periods).9 We treat income as exogenous for simplicity and to match our later
experimental design, but the model easily allows endogenous sources of income.
The agent discounts future utility exponentially by the discount factor δ ≤ 1. We use con-
ventional exponential discounting to focus on the eﬀect of EGB and isolate its role in behavior.
Alternative discounting models such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting can be straightforwardly in-
corporated. Moreover, we do not model the agent as applying his EGB to his discount function,
as EGB is only relevant when numerical values are shrouded by math. Whereas the value of a
future asset is often shrouded by exponential calculations, we assume that all explicit and implicit
calculations regarding one’s preferences are fully transparent. In other words, the agent knows his
intertemporal utility function.10
8The problem would not be well-defined if one used a shorter horizon; longer horizons would amplify the effects
of EGB.
9If the interest rate does not differ from zero for at least two periods, then compounding plays no role in the
agent’s optimization and our model of EGB does not come into play. We focus on positive interest rates for reasons
of exposition and economic relevance, but the propositions are straightforwardly extended to admit negative rates.
10As an analogy, someone who has trouble with trigonometry does not lose their depth perception even though the
visual system of the brain uses trigonometric calculations to calculate depth. In the same way, the agent’s inability
to estimate exponential growth need not place any restrictions on his preferences. While the exponential discounting
form is itself the subject of much debate (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002), we use it only as a simple
approximation of time preference that allows us to place our emphasis on mistakes about the budget constraint.
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Thus the agent’s period-0 problem is:
max
cˆ
T∑
t=0
δtu(cˆt) (3)
subject to the budget constraint written in terms of the period-T value of money,
T∑
s=0
cˆs · p(~i, s; 1) ≤
T∑
s=0
ys · p(~i, s; 1) (4)
where p(~i, t; 1) =
∏T−1
j=t (1 + ij) is the correct interest perception. However, since the agent misper-
ceives exponential growth, he believes that his budget constraint is instead:
T∑
s=0
cˆs · p(~i, s;α) ≤
T∑
s=0
ys · p(~i, s;α) (5)
Equation (5) assumes that the agent treats all of his consumption and income in all periods as the
cash ﬂows from a single asset, and then applies Equation (2) with the constraint that his lifetime
wealth must have non-negative value. This is the most parsimonious, but not the only possible
assumption. For example, the agent could calculate the present value of each period’s income and
consumption in isolation, applying e.g. 1/p(<i0, ..., is−1>, 0) to period s. The exact pattern of
distortion depends on the procedure used, but our results are robust to any choice of procedure.
We follow (5) for parsimony.
Taking ﬁrst-order conditions, we derive a modiﬁed Euler condition of the form:
u′(ct+1) = u
′(ct)
p(~i, t;α)
p(~i, t+ 1;α)
(6)
This reduces to the standard Euler condition when α = 1, but otherwise introduces a distortion
into how the agent plans to allocate consumption across periods.
The agent’s period-0 consumption is deﬁned implicitly by:
[
T∑
s=0
p(~i, s;α)u′
−1
(
p(~i, s;α)u′(c0)
p(~i, 0;α)δs
)]
≡
T∑
s=0
ys · p(~i, s;α) (7)
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Equation (7) speciﬁes what the agent will do in the current period and what the agent plans to do in
future periods but not necessarily what the agent actually does in future periods. The agent must
satisfy his true budget constraint in the current period: c0 ≤
∑T
s=0 ys · p(~i, s; 1)/p(~i, 0; 1). Whoever
lends to the agent will ensure that this condition is satisﬁed. When it binds we will assume that
the agent consumes his full wealth in period 0.
The intuition for the theoretical results of this paper lies in Equation (7). Exponential-growth
bias leads to two perceptual errors: one for each side of the equation. On the left-hand side,
the agent misperceives the relative prices of consumption over time. On the right-hand side, he
misperceives his lifetime wealth.
Lemma 1 (Under-estimation by period) Suppose 0 ≤ α < α′ < 1, then:
p(~ı, t;α)
p(~ı, t+ 1;α)
≤
p(~ı, t;α′)
p(~ı, t+ 1;α′)
The inequality holds strictly if there exist j > k > t s.t. ij > 0, ik > 0.
Lemma 1 implies that if interest rates are always positive then a biased agent perceives the price
of future consumption to be relatively too high, and the price of present consumption relatively
too low. We henceforth refer to this as the price effect of exponential-growth bias. As in standard
consumer theory, a change in prices (albeit a misperception in this case) leads to an income eﬀect
and a substitution eﬀect. Since future prices are perceived to be higher than they actually are ($1
today is perceived to buy less in the future than it actually can), income is perceived to be lower.
This force will generally decrease planned consumption in all periods. But since the relative prices
of early periods are perceived to be lower than they actually are, this will cause more planned
consumption in early periods and less planned consumption in later periods. The net change in
immediate consumption therefore depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),
which we turn to in Proposition 3.
On the right-hand side of Equation (7) the agent misperceives the future value of his income. If
α < 1 then p(~i, t;α) will be too low and so he will overestimate the present value of future income.
In other words, the agent underestimates his budget when income is received early in life but he
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overestimates income when he receives it late in life. We henceforth refer to this as the wealth effect
of exponential-growth bias.11
The wealth eﬀect leads to our ﬁrst result. An agent with EGB will perceive an income stream
that delays income as more valuable than an equally valuable income stream that expedites it.12
Lemma 2 (Income Deferment) Given income streams ~y and ~z and interest rates ~ı such that:
(i)
T∑
s=0
(
ΠTj=s(1 + ij)
)
ys =
T∑
s=0
(
ΠTj=s(1 + ij)
)
zs > 0
(ii)
t∑
s=0
(
Πtj=s(1 + ij)
)
ys >
t∑
s=0
(
Πtj=s(1 + ij)
)
zs ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T − 2},
then V̂0,T (~y,~ı;α) < V̂0,T (~z,~ı;α) for any α < 1.
The lemma states that (i) given two income streams of the same (actual) discounted value in
which (ii) the value of the income received from ~y up to any point t < T − 1 exceeds the value of
the income received thus far from ~z, the agent will perceive ~z as having higher value than ~y. Thus
~z represents a stream of cash ﬂows of the same actual present value as ~y, but with the cash ﬂows
arising at relatively later dates. Hence any income distributions that receive proportionately more
of their present value later in life will be perceived as more valuable from a t = 0 perspective.
Since income received in later periods is overvalued and income received in the present is
undervalued, delaying income leads to the misperception that the value of lifetime income is greater
than it actually is. The wealth eﬀect thus leads to our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1 (Deferred Income Increases Consumption) Delaying income from period t <
(T − 1) to τ > t in a manner that keeps (true) lifetime income unchanged will cause an agent with
EGB to increase consumption in period 0.
11Because we are treating the cash flows as exogenous, there is no possibility of substitution. Extending the model
to endogenize income, for example by including a labor supply decision, would naturally lead to a similar income and
substitution effect to those for consumption choices.
12For example, suppose the interest rate is i = 9% and T = 10. The value of $100 in t = 0 is $237 in t = 10. A
fully biased agent, however, will perceive the $100 in t = 0 as worth $190 in t = 10. An unbiased decision maker
would be indifferent between an income stream in which $100 is received in t = 0 and nothing in all other periods,
and a second stream in which $237 is received in t = 10 and nothing in all other periods. The biased agent would
gladly choose the latter because he overestimates its present value.
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The implication is that when the agent receives compensation stated nominally and received in the
future, he will overestimate his budget and overconsume in the present. The larger the delay, the
larger the error. For suﬃciently large bias and suﬃciently high interest rates, a lump-sum payment
to the agent late in the lifecycle could even make him worse oﬀ.
From Proposition 1, if income is suﬃciently delayed, interest rates are suﬃciently high, and the
agent is suﬃciently biased, the agent will overconsume in t = 0 relative to the optimum for any
preferences. This provides the basis for Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Overconsumption From Future Wealth) If an agent receives all of his wealth
in the last period T > 1 , then period-0 consumption is higher for more biased interest perception
functions (i.e. increasing in EGB).
Proposition 2 states that any biased agent who receives all his wealth in the last period will
overconsume at the beginning of his lifecycle. This is a suﬃcient condition for overconsumption,
though by no means a necessary one. If, for example, income tends to be received very early, the
agent may overconsume if the perceived price eﬀect dominates the wealth eﬀect. Thus the price
eﬀect alone can also generate another suﬃcient condition for over-consumption.
Proposition 3 (Overconsumption) If an agent faces a vector of weakly-positive cash flows ~y
(yt ≥ 0∀t, ∃s s.t. ys > 0), then the period-0 consumption of an agent with EGB is greater than
that of an unbiased agent if − u
′(c)
u′′(c)c > 1, i.e. the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is
greater than one.
Proposition 3 states that as long as the EIS>1, a biased agent will overconsume at the begin-
ning of his lifecycle.13 This of course also implies that a necessary condition for underconsumption
is that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one. We stress this is not a suf-
ﬁcient condition for underconsumption, however, as even if the agent is highly inelastic (i.e. his
instantaneous utility function is very concave and therefore EIS is very low), from Proposition 2
he will still overconsume in period 0 if his wealth is received as a lump-sum in the last period. Of
13This result generalizes the under-saving result of Goda, Manchester and Sojourner (2014) in their working paper
version. Their 2-period model, in which all income is received in period 1, generates overconsumption whenever the
EIS >1.
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course, less extreme income paths may also generate overconsumption. For example, we calibrate
that an agent who earned the median real wage between ages 20 and 65 and then retired until the
median life expectancy of 78 would overconsume at age 20 for any preferences which generate a
non-decreasing consumption plan.14 As a consequence, at later ages the agent will underconsume
from the perspective of the optimal lifetime consumption path. The wealth effect is therefore likely
to dominate decisions in many real-world settings, and the exact value of the agent’s EIS is of
second-order importance.
The wealth eﬀect also does not rely on the agent using the modiﬁed Euler condition in (6),
whereas the price eﬀect does. It is possible that even EGB agents do satisfy the true Euler condition,
since as usually formulated it requires balancing marginal utilities across a single period with a single
interest rate: u′(ct+1) = (1 + it)u
′(ct). The price eﬀect is generated through the misperception of
the Euler equation. In this sense, our results derived from the wealth eﬀect (Propositions 1–2) are
more robust than those derived from the price eﬀect (Proposition 3).
The magnitude of the agent’s misperception is a function of timespan (e.g. he makes no error
regarding the present value of money from next period since compounding only occurs after spans
greater than one), and so he will generally behave in a dynamically inconsistent manner. Concep-
tually, this can be distinguished from other varieties of dynamic inconsistency that are preference-
based (Strotz, 1956; Loewenstein, 1987; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Loewenstein
et al., 2003; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006), since this dynamic inconsistency is generated instead by
perceptual errors regarding compounding interest. Of particular interest is the predictable pattern
in which the dynamic inconsistency manifests.
Proposition 4 (Dynamic Inconsistency) If the agent has a negative level of savings at the end
of period t < T − 1,
t∑
s=0
(ys − cs)Π
t
j=s(1 + ij) < 0 (8)
then the agent’s period-t plan of consumption will exceed the period-(t+1) plan in all periods. If
the inequality in expression (8) is reversed then planned consumption in t+ 1 will increase for all
14We simplify this exercise by assuming the agent faces no risk and can freely borrow or save at a real interest rate
of 5%.
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periods, and if the balance equals zero planned consumption in t+ 1 will be unaffected.
The proposition can be explained intuitively. Since the agent underestimates exponential
growth, each period he will underestimate the change in his asset position. If his balance is positive
then he receives an unexpected windfall and if the balance is negative he receives an unexpected
loss. Since the agent’s perception of the period-T value of income received at some intermediate
future period τ depends only on interest rates between τ and T , the perception does not change
over time. The only change in the perception of the budget is the growth of the current balance,
and this surprise change to his current wealth causes him to shift his planned consumption vector
in the same direction as the change.
This proposition implies that whenever a biased agent’s net worth is currently negative then his
projected consumption plans will always exceed his actual consumption. This can be particularly
costly for the agent if he has the option to commit to lower bounds on his future consumption. This
may manifest in the housing market, where housing is a consumption commitment. A homeowner
will ﬁnd it costly and diﬃcult to decrease his housing consumption in the next period since this
generally requires selling the home.
The agent will also underestimate the costs of debt, which can lead to a debt trap of sorts.
Because the agent underestimates the speed at which a debt grows, he will underestimate both
the size and the number of payments necessary to amortize a debt in a given amount of time. Let
a(L,~ı;α) be the agent’s perception of the periodic payment required to payoﬀ a loan over T periods
with principal L, and with interest rate vector ~ı.
Proposition 5 (Debt Repayment) Define a(L,~i;α) such that Vˆ (< L,−a, . . . ,−a >,~i;α) ≡ 0.
If α < α′, then |a(L,~i;α)| < |a(L,~i;α′)|. Moreover, an agent with EGB (i.e. α < 1) will underes-
timate the number of periodic payments of a fixed size necessary to repay a given debt.
The proposition formally states the intuition introduced by Stango and Zinman (2009) that
EGB can lead to excessive leverage. The agent believes that the periodic payment a(L,~i;α) is
the amount necessary to fully repay a debt of amount L in the speciﬁed number of periods. This
perceived amount is strictly decreasing in the degree of bias. By underestimating compounding
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interest, the biased agent will underestimate the costs of holding debt leading to the various puzzles
discussed earlier. While we do not focus on these predictions in this paper, we note that they are
consistent with the ﬁndings of previous research. For example, Soll, Keeney and Larrick (2011)
ﬁnd that US adults underestimate the number of payments needed to pay oﬀ a hypothetical credit
card balance.
A corollary of Proposition 5 is that, given the repayment schedule for a loan, the agent will
over-estimate the periodic interest rate. However, when the frequency of repayments exceeds the
frequency at which interest is framed — for example monthly payments on a loan framed with an
annual percentage rate — an agent may in fact under-estimate the annual interest rate. Consider
the following algorithm. First, the agent computes the monthly interest rate from the repayment
schedule. Here the agent will over-estimate the monthly rate. Second, the agent compounds the
interest rate to compute the equivalent annual rate. Here the agent will under-estimate the annual
rate given the monthly rate. The ﬁnal result is ambiguous: the agent may either under- or over-
estimate the equivalent annual rate. This process can explain the seemingly contradictory ﬁnding
in Stango and Zinman (2009) that 98% of people underestimate the interest rate when given a debt
and a monthly repayment plan over one year.15 Our model predicts that an agent with EGB will
under-estimate the equivalent annual rate when presented with the range of values they use.
2.3 Framing and Choice Architecture
This last result highlights the fact that a biased agent’s valuation of a particular debt or investment
product can depend on how the product is framed. There are several dimensions of a product
description in which framing will matter such as the length of the period chosen to frame the rate,
and presenting the simple interest rate versus the compound interest rate. Biased agents will also
incorrectly combine interest rates. Hence how interest rates are framed for portfolios that have
assets with multiple interest rates over time or over diﬀerent accounts can aﬀect a biased agent’s
choices. Other aspects of the choice architecture could have large impacts on biased agents as
15More formally, Stango and Zinman (2009) use two questions from the Survey of Consumer finances, which we can
interpret in our framework as the agent solving for V̂ (< L, 0, ..., 0 >,< i, ..., i >;α) = V̂ (< 0,m, ...,m >,< i, ..., i >;α)
and then p(< i, ..., i >, 0;α) = p(< 0, ..., 0, R >, 0;α). While the agent will over-estimate i given L and m, he may
nonetheless underestimate R.
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well. A biased agent may have strong preferences for the payment timing of a loan about which an
unbiased agent may be indiﬀerent. Thus far our analysis has treated these features as exogenous.
The model makes important predictions about how these frames aﬀect behavior.
Lenders are incentivized to choose as short a time-period as possible in order to minimize the
perceived repayment – for example, the market leader in the UK payday-lending industry advertised
its loans as “1 percent per day”.16 For investments, ﬁrms are incentivized to maximize the perceived
return for potential investors and thus choose relatively large frames. A striking example of this
eﬀect is the multi-year frame chosen by many structured deposits products, which oﬀer for example
a 5-year return of 30% rather than annual returns of 5.4%.
Framing can also play an important role when presenting a short-term loan as simple interest
or compound interest. When the term of a loan is shorter than a single period, the simple interest
exceeds the periodic interest. Short-term loans with simple interest rates often imply exceedingly
high periodic rates and as a consequence lenders will prefer to frame the short-term loans as simple
interest.17 For example, a lender will prefer to emphasize that a person will pay back $125 on a
$100 loan over one month, instead of stating that the annualized rate on the loan is 1355%.
For time horizons longer than a single period there are a variety of payment schedules that are
available to the lender. A lender can frame a loan as a principal with a ﬁxed interest rate and loan
term, e.g. “$1,000 at 10% per year for two years”, as a ﬁxed periodic payment over a loan term,
e.g. “$25.16 monthly payments for two years”, or a single payment at the end of the loan term,
e.g. “$1,210 paid two years from today”. Because an agent with EGB underestimates the amount
of the payments, the loan will be more attractive when framed in terms of the interest rate. When
framed in terms of payments, since the magnitude of the error is increasing in time, periodic ﬁxed
payments will be viewed as more attractive than a single lump sum payment at the end of the
term. Likewise periodic ﬁxed payments will be seen as more favorable than a schedule of payments
that is increasing over time.
The model also predicts how a biased agent will combine interest rates over time. An agent
16This compounds to 3778% annually, and 5853% including fees. Beginning 1 Jan, 2015, it was subject to a binding
cost cap of 0.8% simple interest per day imposed by the financial regulator.
17We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
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with accurate perceptions knows that an interest vector is equivalent to the vector of its geometric
mean. A biased agent, on the other hand, will tend to overestimate the constant-rate equivalent for
a given interest vector. A biased agent prefers a varying interest vector (i.e. not risky but simply
changing over time) to an equivalent non-varying interest vector when saving. For example, if an
asset has a 60% return in odd periods and 0% return in even periods, a 0-Eddie will believe that
this is equivalent to a 30% return every period when in fact it is equivalent to a 26.5% return.18
The premium that the agent places on the varying interest vector is increasing in his bias. We ﬁnd
strong evidence for this prediction in Section 3.2.3. Thus even a risk-neutral 0-Eddie may exhibit
as-if risk preferences. An economist who observes the agent’s behavior, and believes the variation
in returns is generated by risk, but does not account for EGB, may infer that the agent is risk-
seeking. Ensthaler et al. (2013) incentivize subjects to determine the median of a distribution that
is generated from a compounded geometric return, equal chance each period that an asset gives a
70% return or a -60% return. They ﬁnd that subjects dramatically overestimate the median of the
distribution, consistent with the notion that they perceive the asset growing linearly. As Ensthaler
et al. (2013) explain not only will Eddie misperceive the returns, but he will also misperceive the
skew of the distribution.
Finally, biased agents will make a diﬀerent kind of combining error when projecting the value
of a portfolio with several accounts at diﬀerent interest rates. They will tend to underestimate
the importance of accounts with relatively high interest rates. For example, if an agent has two
accounts, one with $100 at 12% and one with $1,000 at 1%, a fully-biased agent would perceive
the return on the total portfolio to be 2% per period, when in fact the return begins at 2% in the
ﬁrst period and then increases and asymptotically approaches 12% as the ﬁrst account dominates.
However a fully biased agent would be indiﬀerent between this portfolio and a single account with
$1,100 and a 2% interest rate.
18The error is even more dramatic when negative interest rates are involved. For example a fully biased agent
prefers an asset that has a 90% return followed by a -80% return, yielding a -38.4% net return, over one that does
not grow.
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3 EGB in the U.S. Population
In this section, we examine whether our parameterized model of EGB is a useful measurement that
has meaning outside the laboratory. We shift from a lifecycle consumption paradigm to a direct
perception elicitation in order to directly estimate the EGB parameter α with the fewest potential
confounds. The experiment has several purposes. First, we estimate the distribution of EGB
among a representative subsample of the U.S. population, making decisions in their normal work
environment. Second, the experiment explores the external relevance of EGB in economic decision
making by correlating it with subjects’ total savings. We interpret this not as a further direct test
of the theory (Propositions 2 and 3) due to substantial unobserved heterogeneity, but rather as
an indication that our measure of EGB can be usefully applied to explain some of the variation
in ﬁnancial decision making. Third, the experiment tests whether the bias is robust to a simple
graphical intervention. Fourth, the experiment tests speciﬁc features of our model in contrast to
the Wagenaar-Sagaria model, namely: (1) people correctly estimate a single period of interest, (2)
people underestimate the value when there is negative interest, (3) people combine interest rates
in a way that biases them toward the arithmetic mean , and (4) people do not decompose ﬁnancial
problems into a series of single periods.
3.1 Design/Method
3.1.1 Design
Subjects faced a series of questions describing two assets and were asked to indicate the initial
value for one asset which would equate the assets’ ﬁnal values after an indicated length of time.
For example, the ﬁrst question is a choice between “Asset A that has an initial value of $100 and
grows at an interest rate of 10% each period” and “Asset B that has an initial value of $X and does
not grow.” Subjects were asked for the value of X which would make the two assets equal value
after 20 periods. Appendix Table C.2 displays the full list of questions presented to subjects.
Questions 1–10 are our primary focus in the analysis, and the order of presentation was random-
ized ﬁrst at the domain level (corresponding to the ﬁrst 3 question categories listed in Appendix
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Table C.2) and then within domain at the question level. The “exponential” domain comprised
four questions similar to the example above. The “ﬂuctuating-interest” domain comprised three
questions of the form: “Asset A has an initial value of $P and grows at an interest rate of i% in odd
periods (starting with the ﬁrst) and at j% in even periods; Asset B has an initial value of $X and
does not grow; What value of X will cause the two assets to be of equal value after T periods?”.
The “catch-up savings” domain comprised three questions which varied the maturity of the assets,
of the form: “Asset A has an initial value of $P and grows at an interest rate of i% each period;
Asset B has an initial value of $X and grows at an interest rate of i% each period; What value of
X will cause the two assets to be of equal value after Asset A grows for T periods and Asset B
grows for S periods?”
Subjects received a payment based on their accuracy on each question. The payment rule was
piecewise-linear in the percentage error: each answer within 10% of the truth would receive $0.80;
each answer within 25% would receive $0.60; each answer within 50% would receive $0.20; and each
answer less than 50% of or more than 150% than the truth would not receive a payment. In addition
to the incentive payments, subjects received $5.00 for completing the entire experiment. Subjects
had a week to do the experiment at their leisure. All payments were made through Knowledge
Networks’ internal payment mechanism, which subjects were already experienced with, and were
usually paid within a week of completion.
The experimental instrument intentionally did not mention the use of tools for answering the
questions. Subjects could potentially use whatever tools that they had access to: from nothing
to advice from friends or ﬁnancial calculators. This design neither discouraged subjects’ natural
tendency to use tools nor did it prime subjects to use them. Although the incentives are not nearly
as large as they would be for making actual ﬁnancial decisions in the marketplace, a subject that
exploited tools could earn substantially more for their time.
After completing the primary experiment, subjects were randomly assigned into a control
(N=384) and a treated (N=185) group to test the eﬀect of a simple information presentation
or “nudge” on a second set of questions. The intervention, shown in Appendix Figure C.1, shows
the growth of $100 at one or more relevant interest rates, and allowed the subject to specify the time
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horizon plotted. Treated subjects were shown this intervention beneath each question. Subjects
answered an additional 16 questions, 10 from the original three diagnostic domains and 3 each from
the domains of periodic savings – asking the ﬁnal value of a series of regular contributions – and
portfolio – asking the equivalent principal for a portfolio of assets at diﬀerent rates. These latter
two domains are qualitatively more complicated to solve.19 We exclude these additional questions
from all analysis until Sections 3.2.3, focusing just on the 10 pre-intervention questions where all
subjects faced identical circumstances.
3.1.2 Sample
The experiment consists of an incentivized online experiment conducted on a nationally-representative
sample. Participants were recruited through Knowledge Networks, which maintains a recruited
panel of U.S. households.20 A random sample of subjects from the Knowledge Networks panel were
invited to participate in our study. Subjects logged into the Knowledge Networks portal, and were
automatically transferred to an external website where our study was hosted.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample. Column 1 shows the characteristics of all
990 KN panelists who were invited to participate, while Column 2 comprises the 569 subjects who
chose to participate. Men were signiﬁcantly more likely to complete the study (63% vs. 52% for
women, p<0.01), so that 46% of the ﬁnal sample were women. The average age of those opting
to complete the study was also somewhat lower than those opting out, although this result was
largely driven by a very high completion rate amongst 18–21 (i.e. college-aged) panelists. Race
and education characteristics did not predict study completion, with 28% of subjects having only a
high school degree, 29% some college or an associate’s degree, and 37% having a bachelor’s degree
or more.
For some of the analysis, we merge our experimental dataset with an external dataset containing
subjects’ ﬁnancial characteristics. Participants in the Knowledge Networks panel are regularly
19We do note formalize a metric of “difficulty”, but note that, for example, Catch-up Savings questions require a
subject to sum T separate Exponential questions.
20Participant households are selected randomly by Knowledge Networks based on their address, and are provided
with a laptop and free internet access if necessary. Full details on the KnowledgePanel sampling methodology are
available at http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/knpanel/KNPanel-Design-Summary.html
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asked about their income and assets, and we will use this information to investigate the eﬀect of
exponential-growth bias on savings. These data are only available for a subset of subjects (the
others either being ineligible or refusing to answer), and we present them in the fourth column of
Table 1. Unsurprisingly, this subsample tends to be older and better educated than those for whom
ﬁnancial data are unavailable: the mean age is 50.02, and 53% have at least a bachelor’s degree.
The higher education attainment rate is also reﬂected in the high average household income of
$90,257 among this group. This group also had signiﬁcant investible assets — a mean of $241,055
— suggesting that they could overstate the degree of ﬁnancial sophistication relative to a poorer,
less well-educated population. However, we ﬁnd that the sample with complete ﬁnancial data are
in fact slightly more biased than the sample with missing ﬁnancials – the partial correlation of our
α measure with the absence of ﬁnancial data is 0.024 (p<0.01).
3.2 Results
We begin this section by showing evidence that subjects in the experiment were systematically
aﬀected by exponential-growth bias despite the availability of ﬁnancial tools outside the laboratory.
We then estimate an individual-level bias parameter based on the model presented in Section 2,
and investigate its distribution and correlation with household ﬁnances.
3.2.1 Bias
For each subject i and exponential-growth question j, we ﬁrst calculate the natural logarithm
of the ratio of the given answer to the correct answer. Let a subject’s responses on question
j ∈ {1, ..., J} = J be denoted by rij , and the correct response be given by cj . We calculate
eij = ln(rij/cj). This provides a consistent measure across questions that may have answers that
diﬀer by several orders of magnitude. Were a subjects to answer exactly correctly, this statistic
would be exactly zero. As subjects were not prohibited from using calculators, spreadsheets, and
online tools to help them answer the questions, such an outcome would not strain credulity. If
subjects’ answers are unbiased but noisy such that errors on an absolute or percentage basis are
symmetrically distributed around zero, then the median of ln(rij/cj) should also be zero. Moreover,
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Invited
Sample
Study
Completers
Completers w/o
Assets Data
Completers with
Assets Data
US Population
Demographics
Female 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.52
Age 47.38 44.73 39.00∗∗ 50.02∗∗∗ 45.21
(17.30) (17.17) (17.41) (15.15)
Education
Completed High School 0.27 0.28 0.37 0.19 0.28
Some College 0.30 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.27
Bachelor’s Degree+ 0.36 0.37 0.20∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.28
Race/Ethnicity
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.07 0.07∗ 0.08 0.06 0.14
Other, Non-Hispanic 0.05∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04 0.07 0.08
Hispanic 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.17 0.10∗ 0.18
2+ Races, Non-Hispanic 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Financial Products
Has had credit card 0.83 0.70 0.94
Has used payday loan 0.07 0.08 0.05
Has had car loan 0.61 0.48 0.74
Has had mortgage 0.60 0.39 0.79
Has had second mortgage 0.16 0.08 0.23
EGB - alpha
Alpha 0.54 0.57 0.52
(0.55) (0.57) (0.54)
Assets/Income
Non-Housing Assets 241055.74∗∗∗ 132822
(375913.20)
Household Income 79945.08 68763.74∗∗∗ 90257.60∗∗∗ 69759
(50224.95) (49887.68) (48371.71)
Observations 990 569 273 296
Notes: Initial sample comprises all subjects invited to participate in the study. Study completers answered or skipped all
questions. Assets data merged from external dataset provided by Knowledge Networks. Financial products indicate whether
subject has ever had or used the product in the past. US Population is based on authors calculation from 2014 Current
Population Survey (and SCF for asset data). Table entries are unweighted means; standard deviations for non-binary variables
given in parentheses. Stars denote significant difference from US population average, using study weights; ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p <
0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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if subjects’ answers are a power of the correct answer, rij = c
1+εij
j where ε ∼ N (0, σ
s), then the
log-ratio should be normally distributed about zero.
We also calculate subject-level averages of the above log-ratio:
e¯i =
1
10
10∑
j=1
ln(answerij/correctj)
If subjects are making unbiased errors, then the above results for the means and medians hold.
Moreover, if rij/cj is i.i.d. lognormal, then the averaging should cause the distributions to collapse
towards zero.
Instead, we ﬁnd a systematic bias in the error, the sign of which depends on whether exponential-
growth bias predicts that subjects should over- or under-predict on that question. Figure 1 plots
the distribution of log errors at the question×subject and subject level. As expected, the modal
question×subject error is zero – the likeliest interpretation is that a large mass of subjects are
able to use calculators to get the answer exactly correct. However, where under-estimation is
predicted, both the median (-0.349) and mean (-0.554) of the question×subject error distribution
are signiﬁcantly negative (p<0.01). At the subject level, both the median (-0.507) and mean
(-0.602) are more negative than before. The pattern is reversed where exponential-growth bias
predicts over-estimation: the question×subject distribution is shifted sharply to the right and the
mean error (0.209) is now signiﬁcantly positive (p<0.01), although the median error in this case is
zero.21
3.2.2 Estimating Alpha
Let ~a(α) : R → R
|J |
+ be a function that generates the answers consistent with a given level of
α on a set of questions J . Thus ~a(1) is a vector containing the |J | correct answers. For every
subject, we calculate the value of α which minimizes the mean squared error of the model against
their actual answers, with each question normalized by the correct answer. This normalization
avoids having those questions which contain large values for the solution arbitrarily dominate the
21These results imply that pooling all questions by reversing the scale on the underestimation-prone items would
also produce a significant result. At the subject level, both the mean (0.400) and the median (0.405) are significantly
positive.
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Figure 1: Subject Mistakes
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Notes: Underestimation based on the questions for which EGB predicts a downward-biased answer; overestimation
from those where an upward bias is predicted by the theory. Question-level plots the distribution of errors in
predicted asset growth, and should be symmetric about zero if subjects’ errors on a percentage basis are symmetric
about zero; subject-level computes the mean of ln(answer/correct) at the subject level, and should converge to a
point mass at zero in the absence of systematic bias. The means of all four distributions are significantly different
from zero (significant at p < 0.01).
estimation procedure. That is, we estimate:
α̂i = argmin
α
1
|J |
∑
j∈J
(
rij − aj(α)
aj(1)
)2
(9)
The estimator described by (9) is not constrained to values lying within the unit interval.
Values of α greater than one are simply interpreted as an individual who overestimates the rapidity
of exponential growth. We perform an unconstrained numerical optimization to estimate an α̂i for
each subject.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of our estimates of α, using our full sample of com-
pleters. We characterize 85% of the population with an α between [0, 1]. The median α is 0.53,
and the mean is 0.60. Moreover, we have a large number of people who are completely, or nearly
completely, fully biased: 33% of subjects (184/561) have an alpha of “exactly” zero (i.e. within
[−0.001, 0.001]). In contrast, only 4% (23/561) are completely correct (even using a more gener-
ous interval of [0.99,1.01]). Based on our bootstrapping procedure, we can reject that the 80th
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percentile has α = 1 at 95% conﬁdence. Similarly, we cannot reject that the 37th percentile has
α = 0.
Although EGB appears to be pervasive we qualify this with two major caveats. The stakes in
our experiment are much lower than in many ﬁnancial decisions. Second, when horizons are short
and interest rates are in the single digits, people in the upper quartile of α will not make very large
errors. For instance with a horizon as long as 20 periods and a 5% periodic interest rate, a 0-Eddie
will underestimate the value of an asset by 25% but a 0.9-Eddie will only underestimate by 5%.
On the other hand, a 0.9-Eddie will make substantial errors in some situations, for instance the
0.9-Eddie will underestimate the annual equivalent of a loan that charges 1% a day by 30 percent.
Figure 2: Population Distribution of Alpha
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Notes: Cumulative distribution of alpha, based on full (unweighted) estimation sample. Dashed lines indicate 95%
confidence interval for percentiles of the distribution, based on 5000 bootstrap replications. Confidence intervals
should be read horizontally, e.g. the median alpha is estimated to lie between 0.520 and 0.651 while the 25th
percentile is estimated to be exactly zero.
Question 3 gives us a test of basic interest-rate numeracy. The question asks for the value
of an asset after it grows for only one period (P0 = 100, i = 4%), and a correct answer would
result from any degree of bias. A wrong answer can thus be interpreted as innumeracy. About
74% of our subjects answered this question correctly and 26% did not. Dropping subjects who
fail to answer this question correctly does not substantively change any of the remaining analysis.
25
Moreover, mistakes on this question are uncorrelated with our measure of α (r = 0.04, p=0.29)
which provides reassurance that we are estimating a systematic bias rather than understanding
of the task. Almenberg and Gerdes (2012) ﬁnd that EGB and ﬁnancial literacy are negatively
correlated in contrast to what we ﬁnd here. These results are not inconsistent, however, given that
their measure of ﬁnancial literacy is quite diﬀerent from our Question 3.
Our measure of α is uncorrelated with education, age, race, and sex. Unsurprisingly, the 6%
of subjects who reported an online calculator perform substantially better than the rest of the
population. The mean α in this group is 0.84 (0.32 higher than those who do not use ﬁnancial
calculators) and with a median α of 0.96 (relative to a median amongst those who do not use
ﬁnancial calculators of 0.56). There may be both a causal and self-selection eﬀect in this population,
which our research design does not distinguish. The use of calculators may also help to explain
why our graphical treatment had no eﬀect, as we explain later.
With estimates of individuals’ α we can explore the relationship between EGB and long-run
ﬁnancial outcomes. Proposition 3 states that biased agents will systematically overconsume in early
periods relative to the optimal consumption path when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
greater than unity. This posits exponential-growth bias as a partial explanation for the high degree
of variation in retirement savings within income and education categories found by Bernheim et
al. (2001) and supported by the correlation found in Stango and Zinman (2009). While we do not
have exogenous variation in α we can correlate α with total accumulated assets.
We are able to match ﬁnancial records from an external survey to 296 of our 569 experimental
subjects. As the unmatched cases correspond to refusals or ineligible cases (often college stu-
dents), this leaves us with a slightly older and better-educated subsample. We then estimate the
relationship between our estimate of α and investible assets. We perform regressions of the form:
assetsi = θ1 + θ2 ·α̂i + θ3 ·incomei + θ4 ·agei + θ5 ·malei + θ6 ·hhsizei + θ7educi + εi (10)
where assets and income are measured either as the level or natural logarithm.
The results of this regression are shown in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 present the results where
ln(assetsi) is the dependent variable, and columns 3 and 4 present the results where assetsi is
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the dependent variable. In columns 1 and 3 subjects are uniformly weighted whereas in columns 2
and 4 subjects are weighted by study-speciﬁc post-stratiﬁcation survey weights that re-balance the
sample to national representativeness. All models have state ﬁxed eﬀects. Unsurprisingly, older
people have accumulated more assets, and a 1% increase in income tends to be associated with
slightly more than 1% higher level of savings. Although education is positively associated with
higher total savings, it is only marginally signiﬁcant.
Our coeﬃcient of interest, Alpha, is positive and substantial throughout all the models. The
estimated coeﬃcient in logs is 0.438 and 0.640 in the two models and both are highly signiﬁcant.
The magnitude of the eﬀect is large: all else equal, an un-biased agent will accumulate from
55% (column 1) to 90% (column 2) more assets than a fully biased agent. We caution that this
association is not causally identiﬁed, but note that are several plausible channels including the
over-consumption result of Proposition 3 and the mis-use of credit of Proposition 5 , as well as
possible reverse-causation. Translated into levels in columns 3 and 4, this eﬀect is equivalent to
$87, 877.807 and $93, 499.748 respectively, or approximately one third of the median household’s
non-annuitized wealth at retirement (Poterba, Venti and Wise, 2011). We thus ﬁnd that EGB can
help to predict the large diﬀerences in otherwise equivalent households’ wealth.
3.2.3 Domain-Speciﬁc Predictions and Fingerprints and Stability
The domains were carefully designed not only for aggregate estimation of α, but also to test subtle
and speciﬁc predictions of the model. The “exponential” domain is the simplest and allows for
direct tests of our model to the Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) model described in the introduction.
Question 3 has no compounding and thus our model predicts that subjects should not make any
error in contrast to the Wagenaar-Sagaria model. In our sample, 75.3% of subjects correctly stated
the correct value of $104, and a further 4.0% answered with the interest-only value of $4. Another
novel prediction of our model is that subjects will underestimate the value of a compounding asset
if the interest rates are negative. Amongst the questions with negative interest rates (questions 4,
13, and 14), twice as many underestimate the asset as overestimate – another strong test favoring
our model. Furthermore, 33% of all responses are exactly what a 0-Eddie would choose.
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Table 2: Alpha and Savings
Logs Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alpha 0.438** 0.640*** 87,877.807** 93,499.748***
(0.178) (0.215) (39,269.207) (31,057.441)
Ln(Income) 1.114*** 1.201***
(0.159) (0.149)
Education 0.078 0.023 21,507.573* 16,636.850
(0.061) (0.058) (12,683.178) (13,485.775)
Age 0.059*** 0.058*** 10,639.556*** 10,720.404***
(0.006) (0.006) (1,385.909) (1,407.761)
Female -0.000 -0.018 -34,768.528 -48,270.127
(0.208) (0.212) (40,560.958) (33,933.839)
Household Size -0.104 -0.160* -24,140.997 -28,202.743**
(0.094) (0.091) (14,654.991) (13,251.836)
Income 2.715*** 2.791***
(0.567) (0.516)
N 296 296 296 296
R2 0.47 0.55 0.42 0.47
Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is ln(investible assets), and in columns (3) and (4) is investible assets.
Columns (2) and (4) weight observations using study-specific post-stratification survey weights; columns (1) and (3) are
unweighted. All specifications include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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The ﬂuctuating-interest domain and the portfolio domain both demonstrate people’s tendency
to take the arithmetic mean when combining multiple interest rates.22 A fully biased agent will use
the arithmetic mean on both of these problems. Our model predicts that subjects will overweight
the impact of the higher interest rate on the ﬂuctuating-interest domain, but we also predict that
they will underweight the impact of the higher interest rate in the portfolio domain. We ﬁnd
exactly this pattern amongst our subjects. For example, in question 7 of the ﬂuctuating-interest
domain, the mean growth is exactly zero, but the arithmetic mean of the interest rates is positive.
On this question, 58% of subjects believed the asset would increase while only 22% believed it
would decrease (and 20% got it exactly right). Over the domain as a whole 17% of responses left a
full-bias ﬁngerprint. In the portfolio domain, on question 24 for example, 74% underestimated the
impact of the high interest rate as predicted, and 15% left a full-bias ﬁngerprint. Over the domain
as a whole 9% left a full-bias ﬁngerprint.
These two domains show how Eddie will incorrectly combine interest rates and as a consequence
exhibit as-if risk preferences. Keep in mind that there is no uncertainty in these problems. But
an economist who thinks that uncertainty generates the ﬂuctuating-interest and believes Eddie to
be unbiased, would infer that Eddie is risk-seeking. In contrast an economist who thinks that
Eddie’s portfolio faces risk would observe that Eddie is heavily invested in low-return assets. If the
economist assumed a risk-return tradeoﬀ, she would infer that Eddie is quite risk averse.23
The catch-up savings and periodic savings domains agree with the directional predictions of the
model, but the complexity of these questions implicates additional mathematical errors. Indeed,
33% of responses in the periodic savings domain are below the sum of the contributions!
Fundamentally, the model presumes that Eddie treats assets separately rather than canceling
common terms. For example, Question 8 (20 vs. 15 years at 13%) can be reduced to solving for
a principal of $100 growing for ﬁve periods at 13% interest. More generally, since Eddie gets one
round of interest exactly right, if he were to break down a problem into a sequence of iterated
one-period problems, he would make no mistake. Question 10 in the catch-up savings domain was
22The fluctuating-interest domain is the simplest example of an asset that has known but varying returns over
time. The portfolio domain is the simplest example of a portfolio with two assets that have different returns.
23Eddie’s as-if risk preferences and behavior under uncertainty is the subject of a sister paper in progress.
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designed to directly address this issue; it asks what principal is needed for a one period delay in
savings (9 periods vs 10 periods; the answer is 11+iy0). Subjects do not seem to simplify this into a
one period problem: 19% got the answer correct which is about their accuracy on other problems,
and 67% respond with a principal in the biased direction.
To address the stability of our α parameter estimates, we re-estimate equation (9) using only
subjects’ responses to the second set of 10 questions and then compare our two estimates of α within
subjects. We are most interested in whether subjects identiﬁed as the “extreme” types – that is,
with α ∈ {0, 1} are consistent. This does appear to be the case. Of 126 control subjects identiﬁed
as having α = 0 on the ﬁrst set of questions, 78 (61.9%) yielded an estimate of α = 0 on the second
set.24 In a linear probability model, we ﬁnd that having α = 0 in the ﬁrst set of questions raises the
probability of having α = 0 in the second set by 22.28 percentage points (s.e. 4.41), while having
initially had α = 1 lowers the probability by 41.61 percentage points (s.e. 9.21).
We also conclude that the bias is robust to the provision of information. This may be surprising,
as the intervention made calculating the correct answer in the “exponential” domain all but trivial,
but is not unreasonable – subjects were already free to use whatever tools they wanted to help
them, including ones far more sophisticated than a simple graph. It is likely that subjects for
whom the extra information would have been helpful were already using tools on their own. We
ﬁnd that subjects in the control and treated groups were statistically indistinguishable both in the
pre-intervention and post-intervention phase. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equal distributions
in α values calculated from pre-intervention data fails to reject at a signiﬁcance of p=0.802. The
same test on α values calculated from post-intervention data fails to reject at p=0.618. Thus
exponential-growth bias is unlikely to be eliminated by simple “nudges”: those who would beneﬁt
from the intervention may already be using tools of their own accord. More involved interventions
may have some eﬀect, however. For example, Song (2012) ﬁnds that face-to-face explanation of
compounding along with ﬁnancial advising has a large eﬀect on savings in rural China.
24We focus on control subjects to separate out any effect of the graphical intervention. It is not surprising, however,
that a comparable 34 of 58 (58.6%) treated subjects identified as having zero in the first set of questions were also
identified as having zero in the second set.
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4 Conclusion
While the un-intuitively rapid growth of exponential functions has been observed for ages, the
economic implications have only been considered recently. We ﬁnd that consumers will make
very speciﬁc – and very large – errors in their consumption plans. Moreover, since the bias is
fundamentally about the budget constraint, the model is modular and can thus be easily married
to other economic settings or extensions. Moreover, the bias seems to prevail in the population
as a whole and is a strong predictor of saving behavior even after controlling for the standard
explanatory factors. The bias was robust to an intervention designed to make exponential growth
more salient, and which could be used to obtain the correct response in some domains.
Ignoring the presence of EGB can potentially lead to substantially mis-speciﬁed econometric
models. As a proof of concept, we generate simulated lifecycle consumption data assuming a
constant interest rate of 5%, CRRA utility with EIS=2, full bias, no discounting, and mean-zero
normally distributed error added to optimal consumption each period. We simulate a sample of
1000 agents randomly drawn between the ages of 19 and 66, observing their current and initial
(age 18) consumption. This is as if the economist has two observations of each agent’s annual
consumption, which can be used to infer the agent’s consumption growth over time. We assume
the economist knows that agents are homogeneous with CRRA utility functions. We simulate
the economist’s non-linear least squares estimates of EIS, δ, and α. In Monte Carlo simulations,
this unrestricted estimator performs well, estimating ÊISU = 2.05 (s.e. 0.104), a discount factor
δ̂U = 0.97 (s.e. 0.03), and level of EGB α̂U = −0.014 (s.e. 0.18). An economist who did not
account for EGB will implicitly restrict α = 1. The restricted estimator halves the EIS estimate
to ÊISR = 0.89 (s.e. 0.026) and imposes signiﬁcant impatience in the discount factor δ̂R = 0.68
(s.e. 0.025) to account for the biased agent’s lack of consumption growth over the lifecycle. While
a simple exercise, this shows that EGB can have a large eﬀect on estimates of important economic
objects.
In principle, the re-framing of assets in the presence exponential-growth bias could actually
be used to identify the EIS.25 By reframing the period length at which interest compounds, one
25We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Figure 3: Welfare Eﬀects of EGB
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Notes: The agent earns the median US personal income between ages 20
and 65, then retires and later dies at 78. We assume discounting is already
reflected in interest rates, so the risk-free rate (post-retirement) is zero and
risky rate (pre-retirement) is 5%.
changes a biased agent’s perception of intertemporal prices. This aﬀords the exogenous variation in
intertemporal prices necessary to identify the EIS. The degree of additional structural assumptions
required for identiﬁcation depends on the quality of the data.
Ultimately ﬁeld experiments with large-stake ﬁnancial decisions are needed for ecological validity
— since ultimately these are the target applications of interest.26 Additional research on the
eﬃcacy of interventions to combat EGB in the ﬁeld is also necessary. While EGB was robust to the
intervention in our experiment, it is possible that other “nudges” designed around the predictions of
our model could help improve welfare. The potential welfare consequences are quite large. Figure
3 plots the welfare costs of EGB as a function of α in a back-of-the-envelope calculation. For this
exercise, we again consider CRRA utility and consumption that is dynamically re-optimized every
year when the agent observes his true savings balance or debt. A representative agent earns the
median US personal income between ages 20 and 65, and then retires until death at 78. We assume
discounting is already reﬂected in interest rates, so the risk-free rate (post-retirement) is zero and
26That is, while our experiment used a nationally representative sample, the data are still “artefactual”.
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risky rate (pre-retirement) is 5%. The welfare loss is measured as the fraction of additional income
required to eliminate the loss of utility from EGB. As the ﬁgure shows, for a 0-Eddie the welfare
eﬀects are at least 2.8% of income, and can be as high as 5.2%.
Additional market implications of EGB also remain to be explored. Our results suggest that
it is unlikely that competition would eliminate the bias; ﬁrms may ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to max-
imally exploit the bias instead (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2010; Stango
and Zinman, 2011). Consider a consumer’s choice of mutual funds as an illustration. Not only
will managers have an incentive to present the arithmetic mean return of the fund (rather than the
geometric mean), they may also take a riskier position in order to achieve a higher arithmetic mean.
We expect that ﬁrms’ responses to exponential-growth-biased consumers will leave ﬁngerprints in
many such markets.
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A General Model of Exponential-Growth Bias
We deﬁne a general interest perception function as the following:
Interest Perception Function: An interest perception function is a continuously differentiable
function p : ❘T × {0, 1, . . . , T} → ❘ such that:
(A1) (boundary conditions) p(~0, t) = 1 for all t and p(~ı, T ) = 1 for all ~ı
(A2) (compounding) ∂p(
~i,t)
∂ik
≥ 0 and ∂
2p(~i,t)
∂ij∂ik
≥ 0. For k ≥ t, if iτ = 0 for all τ 6= k, τ ≥ t, then
∂p(~i,t)
∂ik
= 1
(A3) (irrelevancy of history) p(<i1, . . . , it, it+1, . . . , iT−1>, t) = p(<0, . . . , 0, it, it+1, . . . , iT−1>, 0)
(A4) (irrelevancy of order) If for some k, l ≥ t, ik = jl, il = jk, and for any τ /∈ {k, l}, iτ = jτ ,
then ∂p(~ı,t)∂ik =
∂p(~,t)
∂jl
These assumptions deﬁne the minimum requirements for a well-behaved perception of interest
rates. Assumption A1 simply states that an agent does not introduce discounting into a world with
zero interest rates. Similarly, A2 states that agents correctly perceive that a single non-zero interest
rate will discount period-T consumption on a one-for-one basis. This isolates the psychological
phenomenon of neglecting compound growth from simple arithmetic mistakes. It also states that the
cross-partials are weakly positive implying that the perception function is quasiconcave. A3 states
both that historical rates do not directly aﬀect beliefs about future growth, and that perceptions
are not aﬀected by prepending an arbitrary number of zero interest rate periods. This rules out,
for instance, that a high interest rate experienced in an early period would raise the perceived
growth rate in all subsequent periods. It also means that perceptions depend on the number of
times interest compounds rather than the number of periods per se. Finally, assumption A4 states
that any two future interest rates are interchangeable from the perspective of period t. This is akin
to a stationarity assumption, in as much as it implies all future periods are treated symmetrically.
Exponential-Growth Bias: An interest perception function p(~ı, t) exhibits exponential-growth
bias if:
∂
∂ik
 ∂p(~ı,t)∂ij
∂e(~ı,t)
∂ij
 ≤ 0 (11)
where e(~ı, t) =
∏T−1
j=t (1 + ij) is the correct interest perception, T > 1, and the inequality is strict if
j 6= k. An interest perception function p exhibits greater exponential-growth bias than q if:
∂
∂ik
 ∂p(~ı,t)∂ij
∂q(~ı,t)
∂ij
 ≤ 0 (12)
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where T > 1, and the inequality is strict if j 6= k.
Equation (11) highlights the centrality of compounding to EGB. Combined with (A1)-(A2), it
is clear that a biased agent will only misperceive the value of an asset with at least two periods of
non-zero interest for it to grow. There is nothing to act on without any nonzero interest rates, and
because there is no compounding with a single nonzero rate, (A2) implies correct perception even
for a biased agent. Beginning with the addition of a second nonzero rate, however, the neglect of
compounding implied by (11) implies that biased agents will begin to under-estimate exponential
growth.
Moreover, because (A1) bounds the level of the perception function to be one when there is
no interest, and (A2) requires that the partial derivative of the perception function with respect
to an interest rate to be at least one and weakly increasing in all the other interest rates, (A1)-
(A4) and (11) jointly imply that the interest perception function exhibiting the greatest extent of
exponential-growth bias is one which fully linearizes growth: p(~ı, t) = 1 +
∑T−1
j=t ij . This “fully
biased” agent corresponds to the 0-Eddie in our parametric model.
Below, we present the generalized form of Lemmas 1 and 2, and Proposition 5 . All other
results hold for the general model as stated in the text. The main text explains the intuition and
implications of these results.
Lemma A.1 (Generalization of Lemma 1) Suppose p and q both satisfy (A1)-(A4), and p ex-
hibits greater exponential-growth bias than q. Then:
p(~ı, t)
p(~ı, s)
≤
q(~ı, t)
q(~ı, s)
for all s > t.
The inequality holds strictly if there exist j > k > t s.t. ij > 0, ik > 0.
For notational convenience, we deﬁne V̂t,τ (~y,~ı) ≡
∑τ
s=t ys · p(~i, s) as the perceived future value of
an income stream and vector of interest rates.
Lemma A.2 (Generalization of Lemma 2) Given income streams ~y and ~z and interest rates
~ı such that:
(i)
T∑
s=0
(
ΠTj=s(1 + ij)
)
ys =
T∑
s=0
(
ΠTj=s(1 + ij)
)
zs > 0
(ii)
t∑
s=0
(
Πtj=s(1 + ij)
)
ys >
t∑
s=0
(
Πtj=s(1 + ij)
)
zs ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 2},
then V̂0,T (~y,~ı) < V̂0,T (~z,~ı) for any interest perception function p that exhibits EGB.
Proposition A.1 (Generalization of Proposition 5) Let a(L,~ı; p) s.t. Vˆ (< L,−a, . . . ,−a >
,~ı; p) = 0 for an interest perception function p. If p exhibits greater EGB than q, then |a(L,~ı; p)| <
|a(L,~ı; q)|. Moreover, an agent with EGB will underestimate the number of periodic payments of
any given size necessary to repay a given debt.
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B Proofs
The proofs below use the notation of the general form of the model from Appendix A rather than
the special case α-Eddie model presented in the main text. Because the α-Eddie model satisﬁes
assumptions (A1)–(A4), these proofs imply the results in the main text directly.
Proof of Lemma A.1 (Generalization of Lemma 1) First, deﬁne~ı(s) =< x, 0, ..., 0, is+1, ..., iT−1 >.
By (A3), we can write p(~i, t) = p(~i, t + 1) +
∫ it
0
∂p(~ı(t),0)
∂x dx by using the the fundamental theorem
of calculus. Continuing further:
p(~i, t) = p(~i, T ) +
T−t∑
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂p(~ı(j), 0)
∂x
dx
Thus
p(~i, t)
q(~i, t)
=
1 +
∑T−t
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂p(~ı(j),0)
∂x dx
1 +
∑T−t
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂q(~ı(j),0)
∂x dx
(13)
Because ~ı(t) and ~ı(t+1) diﬀer only on a single element, namely the (t+2)-th element it, we have
by the deﬁnition of p is more EGB than q that ∂p(~ı
(t),0)/∂x
∂q(~ı(t),0)/∂x
≤ ∂p(~ı
(t+1),0)/∂x
∂q(~ı(t+1),0)/∂x
The ratio between the term in the numerator and the denominator in the two summations in
(13) is decreasing in j. Reducing the summations an additional step will therefore lower the overall
ratio, and thus we have:
p(~i, t)
q(~i, t)
=
1 +
∑T−t
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂p(~ı(j),0)
∂x dx
1 +
∑T−t
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂q(~ı(j),0)
∂x dx
≤
1 +
∑T−t−1
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂p(~ı(j),0)
∂x dx
1 +
∑T−t−1
j=0
∫ iT−j
0
∂q(~ı(j),0)
∂x dx
=
p(~i, t+ 1)
q(~i, t+ 1)
(14)
Rearranging (13) yields p(
~i,t)
p(~i,t+1)
≤ q(
~i,t)
q(~i,t+1)
, which can be iterated as many times as needed to
yield p(
~i,t)
p(~i,t+n)
≤ q(
~i,t)
q(~i,t+n)
for any positive integer n.
Proof of Lemma A.2 (Generalization of Lemma 2) In this and all subsequent proofs, let the
period-t perception of ﬁnal wealth net of obligations incurred in periods {0, . . . , t− 1} be given by
Ŵt,T (~y) =
[∑t−1
s=0(ys − cs)
∏t−1
j=s(1 + ij)
]
p(i, t) +
∑T
s=t p(i, s)ys, and note that Ŵ0,T (~y) = Vˆ0,T (~y,~ı).
By (ii), y0 > z0. Deﬁne a wealth-preserving shift of income from period zero to period one ~y
(1) =
~y+ < (z0 − y0), (y0 − z0)(1 + i0), 0, . . . , 0 >. Note that (1 + is)p(i, s + 1) > p(i, s) by Lemma A.1,
since p exhibits EGB.
Then Ŵ0,T (~y
(1))− Ŵ0,T (~y) = ((1 + i0)p(~i, 1)− p(~i, 0))(y0 − z0) > 0.
Similarly, for s = 2, . . . , T , recursively deﬁne ~y(s) = ~y(s−1)+ < 0, . . . , (bs − a
(s−1)
s ), (a
(s−1)
s −
bs)(1+is−1), . . . , 0 >, that is, by shifting (y
(s−1)
s −zs) from period s−1 to period s, at the interest rate
is−1. By (ii), (y
(s−1)
s −zs) > 0, and so Ŵ0,T (~y
(s−1))−Ŵ0,T (~y
(s)) =
[
p(~i, s)(1 + is−1)− p(~i, s− 1)
]
(ys−1−
zs−1) for all s < T , and equal to zero for s = T . From (i), however, we have that ~y
(T ) = ~z. Thus
Ŵ0,T (~y) < Ŵ0,T (~y
(1)) < . . . < Ŵ0,T (~y
(T−1)) = Ŵ0,T (~y
(T )) = Ŵ0,T (~z).
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Proof of Proposition 1 We can rewrite equation (7), using the general perception function and
separating period-0 consumption, as c0p(~i, 0) + g(c0) = Ŵ0,T (~y), where
g(c0) =
[
T∑
s=1
p(~i, s)u′
−1
(
p(~i, s)u′(c0)
p(~i, 0)δs
)]
∂g(c0)
∂c0
> 0 because utility is concave and increasing. Now suppose we reduce period-s income by
ǫ and increase period (s+1) income by (1 + is)ǫ. By Lemma 2, ∆Ŵ0,T (~y) > 0 if s < T − 1, and
∆Ŵ0,T (~y) = 0 if s = T − 1. Thus c0 strictly increases for s < T − 1 and is unchanged for s = T − 1.
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider a perception function p(~i, 0) and a less biased perception func-
tion q(~i, 0). We apply equation (7) to both perception functions. The RHS is equal for both because
all wealth is received lump sum at T and so there is no misperception about the wealth available
in period T units.
cp0p(
~i, 0) +
[
T∑
s=1
p(~i, s)u′
−1
(
p(~i, s)u′(cp0)
p(~i, 0)δs
)]
= cq0q(
~i, 0) +
[
T∑
s=1
q(~i, s)u′
−1
(
r(~i, s)u′(cq0)
q(~i, 0)δs
)]
where cj0 represents consumption with the perception function j. By Lemma A.1
p(~i,s)
p(~i,0)δs
> q(
~i,s)
q(~i,0)δs
.
By (A1), (A2), and the deﬁnition of EGB p(~i, t) ≤ q(~i, t). If cp0 ≤ c
q
0 then the inverse-utility term
on the LHS is less than the inverse utility term on the RHS since u′(·) and u′−1(·) are decreasing
functions. But this is a contradiction since every term on the LHS is now less than every term on
the RHS. Therefore cp0 > c
q
0.
Proof of Proposition 3 By Proposition 1 it is suﬃcient to show that an agent will over-consume
when all their income is included in their period-0 endowment; any deferment will exacerbate
the over-consumption so long as all cash ﬂows are weakly positive. Let e(~ı, t) denote exponential
perception. We prove by contradiction.
Suppose c0 ≤ c
∗
0 and −
u′(c)
u′′(c)c > 1. Then from the agent’s Euler condition,
u′(cˆs)
p(~i, 0)
p(~i, s)
δs = u′(c0) ≥ u
′(c∗0) = u
′(c∗s)
e(~ı, 0)
e(~ı, s)
δs (15)
By Lemma A.1,
p(~i, 0)
p(~i, s)
<
e(~ı, 0)
e(~ı, s)
⇒ cˆs < c
∗
s
Now we consider two cases. Case 1: cˆs
p(~i,s)
p(~i,0)
≥ c∗s
e(~ı,s)
e(~ı,0) . Multiply the LHS of this inequality with the
LHS of (15) and the RHS of the inequality with the RHS of (15). This yields cˆsu
′(cˆs) ≥ c
∗
su
′(c∗s).
Observe c · u′(c) is an increasing function iﬀ ddc(c · u
′(c)) > 0 ⇔ − u
′(c)
u′′(c)c > 1 which is the assumed
EIS condition. Therefore cˆs ≥ c
∗
s This is a contradiction, as cˆs < c
∗
s.
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Case 2: cˆs
p(~i,s)
p(~i,0)
< c∗s
p(~i,s)
p(~i,0)
. The budget constraint then implies:
c0 +
T∑
s=1
p(~i, s)
p(~i, 0)
cˆs < c
∗
0 +
T∑
s=1
e(~i, s)
e(~i, 0)
c∗s = y0
Which is a violation of Walras’ law (not expending the full budget), and therefore c0 cannot be
optimal. Thus c0 > c
∗
0.
Proof of Proposition 4 Let cˆt,τ denote the agent’s period-t expectation of consumption in period
τ > t, and let the period-t perception of ﬁnal wealth net of obligations incurred in periods {0, . . . , t−
1} be given by Ŵt,T (~y) as in the proof of Lemma 2.
We note that consumption in every period is a normal good, and from the perceived budget
constraint ĉt,tp(~i, t) +
∑T
s=t+1 p(~i, s)ĉt,s = Ŵt,T , it is clear that if Ŵt,T increases, ĉt,s must also
increase for all s ∈ {t, . . . T}.
At time t, the budget constraint yields
∑T
s=t+1 ĉt,sp(~i, s) = Ŵt,T − ctp(~i, t)
At time t+ 1,
Ŵt+1,T =
t−1∑
s=0
(ys − cs)
t−1∏
j=s
(1 + ij)
 p(~i, t+1)(1+ it) +
(
T∑
s=t+1
p(~i, s)ys
)
+ (yt− ct)p(~i, t+1)(1+ it)
and the budget constraint yields
∑T
s=t+1 ĉt+1,sp(~i, s) = Ŵt+1,T . Thus the perceived budget will
decrease only if Ŵt,T − ctp(~i, t) > Ŵt+1,T , i.e.:t−1∑
s=0
(ys − cs)
t−1∏
j=s
(1 + ij) + (yt − ct)
 [p(~i, t)− (1 + it)p(~i, t+ 1)] > 0
t∑
s=0
(ys − cs)Π
t−1
j=s(1 + ij) < 0
since p(~i, t) < (1 + it)p(~i, t + 1) by Lemma 1 since p exhibits EGB. Thus
∑T
s=t+1 ĉt+1,sp(~i, s) <∑T
s=t+1 ĉt,sp(~i, s), and from the Euler equation each term in the sequence ct+1,s < ct,s giving the
desired result.
Proof of Proposition A.1 (Generalization of Proposition 5) By deﬁnition of a(·),
a(L,~ı; p)
T∑
k=1
p(~ı, k)
p(~ı, 0)
= L = a(L,~ı; q)
T∑
k=1
q(~ı, k)
q(~ı, 0)
By Lemma A.1, p(~ı,k)p(~ı,0) >
q(~ı,k)
q(~ı,0) for all k ≤ T − 2 (and equal for k = T − 1). Thus the summation
in the leftmost term above is strictly greater than the summation in the rightmost term. For the
equality to hold, therefore, we require a(L,~ı; p) < a(L,~ı; q).
40
Similarly, letting e(·) denote correct exponential perception,
L = a(L,~ı; e)
T∑
k=1
e(~ı, k)
e(~ı, 0)
> a(L,~ı; p)
T∑
k=1
e(~ı, k)
e(~ı, 0)
.
An agent expecting under p to pay oﬀ a loan of L in T periods will thus have a strictly negative
balance in period T .
41
C For Online Publication –
Additional Figures and Tables
Table C.1 displays the results of a linear regression of α on several covariates. The model predicts
that α should be positively associated with bankruptcy, payday loan use, balance on credit cards,
no ﬁnancial advice, and negatively associated with the use of tools and advice. The theory is silent
on the other covariates.
We ﬁnd that the use of a ﬁnancial calculator is substantially and signiﬁcantly associated with
greater accuracy. We ﬁnd no evidence for other associations. This certainly in part reﬂects the
limited sample size. Our sample only has 36 subjects who use payday loans and only 38 people
who have gone bankrupt. Future research should explore these relationships where high-cost debt
users are oversampled. We ﬁnd no association with education and α. Other model speciﬁcations
that use categories for education (< HS, HS, some college, college) decade-length age categories,
and a dummy to separate larger households from smaller household generate similar non-signﬁcant
results. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Cronqvist and Siegel (2012) who ﬁnd that general
education explains a minuscule fraction of the variation in ﬁnancial biases. It is also consistent
with a casual observation of the ﬁrst table Almenberg and Gerdes (2012), in which there is no clear
pattern between α as a function of education or income. In contrast Stango and Zinman (2009)
ﬁnd that bias is negatively correlated with income, education, and being male. Their sample size
is about six times larger so this could explain the discrepancy between our results.
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Table C.1: Correlates of Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Income) -0.030 -0.032 -0.027 -0.035
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Education -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Female -0.013 0.003 0.004 -0.001
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
Household Size 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.014
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Primary financial decision maker 0.075 0.087
(0.070) (0.071)
Unemployed / Laid off 0.065 0.068
(0.091) (0.090)
Knows which math needed -0.044 -0.039 -0.073
(0.059) (0.060) (0.063)
Got Q3 Correct -0.016 -0.010 -0.031
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061)
Sometimes carries balance on credit cards 0.015 0.024
(0.058) (0.059)
Declared bankruptcy 0.018 0.063
(0.095) (0.094)
Uses payday loans 0.137 0.146
(0.123) (0.113)
No financial advice -0.031 -0.024
(0.050) (0.050)
Used pen and paper -0.026 -0.060
(0.108) (0.101)
Used a simple calculator -0.062 -0.036
(0.049) (0.049)
Used a graphing calculator 0.111 0.203*
(0.108) (0.119)
Used a spreadsheet 0.120 0.106
(0.095) (0.091)
Used an online financial calculator 0.352*** 0.387***
(0.104) (0.113)
Political conservativism -0.006 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016)
Catholic -0.066 -0.051
(0.062) (0.060)
Jewish 0.356** 0.310*
(0.154) (0.159)
No religion -0.069 -0.071
(0.074) (0.076)
Other religion 0.078 0.106
(0.122) (0.119)
Attends church more than once/year -0.038 -0.043
(0.058) (0.058)
Black -0.131* -0.147*
(0.076) (0.084)
Hispanic 0.023 0.006
(0.082) (0.078)
Other Race -0.017 -0.003
(0.107) (0.103)
Constant 0.902*** 0.839*** 0.756** 0.621*** 0.610*** 0.684*** 0.714*** 0.964***
(0.308) (0.324) (0.308) (0.160) (0.163) (0.157) (0.200) (0.345)
N_Clust 560 560 560 560 559 560 555 554
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Ordinary least squares, the dependent variable is α. The omitted religious group is protestant. Specifications
(2)–(8) include State fixed effects.
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Table C.2: Experiment 2 Questions
Question Parameters Answers Responses by Quartile
Domain Question Asset A: T Asset B: T Asset A: P0 Asset B: P0 Asset A: i Asset B: i Correct X Full-bias X Q25 Q50 Q75
Exponential
1 20 20 100 X 10% 0% 672.75 300 20 300 800
2 50 50 100 X 5% 0% 1146.74 350 250 350 1146.74
3 1 1 100 X 4% 0% 104 104 104 104 104
4 10 10 500 X -8% 0% 217.19 100 100 217.13 420
11 2 2 100 X 50% 0% 225 200 200 225 225
12 35 35 100 X 7% 0% 1067.66 345 275 350 1067.66
13 20 20 1000 X -4% 0% 442.00 200 200 442 700
14 10 10 1000 X -10% 0% 348.68 0 10 348.68 800
Fluctuating i
5 20 20 100 X 0% in odd; 21% in even 0% 672.75 310 210 310 672.75
6 24 24 100 X 4% in odd; 22% in even 0% 1740.68 412 312 412 1500
7 24 24 500 X -20% in odd; 25% in even 0% 500 800 500 625 2600
15 16 16 100 X 0% in odd; 40% in even 0% 1475.79 420 420 500 1475.79
16 20 20 500 X -30% in odd; 30% in even 0% 194.71 500 195 500 2000
17 36 36 100 X -28% in odd; 59% in even 0% 1140.60 658 334 700 1500
Catch-up Savings
8 20 15 100 X 13% 13% 184.24 122.03 115 133.5 184.24
9 10 24 500 X 8% 8% 170.23 308.22 170 208 310
10 10 9 500 X 25% 25% 625 538.46 500 550 625
18 40 20 100 X 7% 7% 386.97 158.33 150 200 387
19 20 10 100 X 13% 13% 339.46 156.52 150 200 339.46
20 14 40 100 X 5% 5% 28.12 56.67 28.12 50 104
Periodic Savings
21 40 40 +10/period X 7% 0% 2136.10 974 149.74 428 1500
22 20 20 +10/period X 10% 0% 630.02 410 100 230 624.19
23 30 30 +10/period X 12% 0% 2702.93 692 150 350 2000
Portfolio
24 40 40 100 (50,X) 10% (5%,15%) 15.58 50 19.105 50 200
25 36 36 100 (50,X) 4% (6%,1%) 2.12 100 10 63 200
26 30 30 100 (50,X) 12% (8%,4%) 768.60 200 75 200 765
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Figure C.1: Example of Task for Experiment with Graphical Intervention
Notes: Subjects estimate the value of X to make both assets equal. For the control group and the first 10 questions asked
of the treated group, there was no graph, but the presentation was otherwise identical. The latter 16 questions asked of the
treated group were accompanied by the graph. The graph was interactive allowing users to observe the growth over different
time horizons.
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